Multi-Disciplinary FEED Safety Endorsement Before Your EPC Bid
“Identifying Safety-Critical Cost Drivers Before the Bid.”
Where We Look?
Undocumented critical information
Safety-critical data that is not clearly specified anywhere in the package.
Cost impact on the lump sum
Findings that change equipment counts, ratings, or scope after contract award.
Schedule impact in EPC phase
Gaps that stall detailed engineering while missing predecessors are rebuilt.
Risk carried into detailed engineering
Open items that will surface as change orders, not design development.
Technically incorrect design
Errors and omissions of a significant nature in the FEED deliverables.
Inconsistency with standards
Deviations from international standards the contract will hold you to.
Endorsement Scope
One review. Six disciplines. One consolidated report.
- Consistency with the project safety philosophy and design basis
- Adequacy of FEED deliverables for a lump-sum EPC bid
- Errors and omissions of a significant nature
- Predecessors in place for every downstream safety deliverable
- Reactive, incompatible, or poorly characterized chemicals
- Relief, blowdown, and disposal basis — and where it relieves to
- Safety-critical equipment list and isolation philosophy
- Work split of process safety studies with third parties
- Fire and gas detection coverage and mapping reliability
- FGS cause & effect logic — does it exist, does it close
- Shared equipment between BPCS and SIS
- Certification needs and final element response constraints
- Hazardous area classification against datasheets and zone drawings
- Earthing, bonding, and lightning protection basis
- Emergency and back-up systems — list and sufficiency
- Siting of HV equipment and lines
- Plot plan and 30% 3D model review with safety input
- Spacing basis between equipment, sub-units, and main units
- Suitability of the fire fighting concept
- Fire-safe valve, joint, and gasket selection for hazardous service
- Fire envelope definition and fireproofing scope
- Basis for fireproofing application
- Safety-related structural design requirements
The Endorsement Report
Numbers only: findings per discipline, and how many need action during the bid, with cost and schedule impacts highlighted. One table, no text. Fast tracking for the bid manager.
Anonymous Pre-Bid Action List (Shortened)
Request Qualification
3 FINDINGSThe fireproofing scope is shown on a single layout drawing with no supporting basis — no fire zone definition, no pool fire dimensions, and no reference to which vessels, skirts and rack sections fall inside the fire envelope. Request the fireproofing basis and the fire scenario data behind it. Without them the protected area cannot be verified, and the quantities in the drawing cannot be checked against any criterion.
The flare radiation study reports contour distances but omits the discharge data behind them — flow, composition, tip elevation and the applied wind cases are not stated. The sterile area boundary, the nearest manned building and a section of the main rack all sit close to the reported 4.7 kW/m² contour. Request the discharge basis and the full radiation dataset; the layout around the flare can only be endorsed against contours that can be reproduced.
Tank and bund zoning was omitted on the basis that produced water is non-flammable. In a skimming failure or tank overfill, a crude layer forms above the water, and the tank vents — primary grade release sources under EI 15 — discharge it during normal operation. Request the justification for the omission, or carry Zone 2 around the tanks, vents and bunds in the bid.
Discuss and Decide Internally
3 FINDINGSThe scope of work mandates CFD for dispersion modelling. Decide the bid position within the time available: commit to convincing the Company after award that a validated consequence modelling package is sufficient and price it accordingly — or request quotations from expert CFD houses now, so the specified scope can be priced if the deviation is refused.
No FGS study exists in the package — no philosophy, no detection layout — and the clarification log states that fire and gas detection is not required. Yet the instrument list and the cause and effect charts both contain FGS equipment and logic. Decide the bid basis: take the quantities as listed and price them, or have the R&S team produce a coarse FGS mapping before bid close and price against that.
The package leaves a large share of layout decisions to the EPC contractor — the philosophy defines intent, not arrangement. Decide to run a coarse layout safety checklist before the bid: siting, spacing, accessibility, maintainability, escape routes and logistics, each assessed against the current plot. The outcome is a register of probable layout changes, distributed to the disciplines.
Add Contingency
3 FINDINGSThe instrument list and P&IDs do not separate SIS transmitters from process instruments; the control philosophy runs safety functions in the BPCS, and shared devices appear throughout. No referencable SIF list exists yet, so a SIF count is estimated at bid stage from the HAZID and comparable processes, with critical functions assumed SIL 2 with voting. A contingency covers the independent transmitters and final elements — which, at these line sizes and in this service, may dominate the piping cost.
The dispersion report defines no downwind exposure for occupied buildings and the toxic cases were plotted for tip height only — no concentration contours at building elevations. Add contingency covering gas detection at the HVAC intakes, intake relocation to the safe side of the building and pressurization and sealing of the affected rooms. Also, consider an ignited case of the discharge and add provision for fire proofing and/or cooling for the side effects on the potentially affected buildings.
The injection pumps discharge at around 90 bar. A flange or seal leak at that pressure produces a jet fire, not a pool fire — a directed flame reaching 15–20 m, hot enough to defeat pool-fire-rated protection. The rack legs and the vessel supports within reach of the pump bay (15mx15m) are inside this scenario and standard cementitious fireproofing does not survive jet impingement. Add contingency for jet-fire-rated protection. Also, add provision for a remote-operated isolation valve on the pump inlet or outlet to limit the fire duration.
Request Qualification
3 FINDINGSThe telecom and security layouts provide cabinets in five buildings; the block diagram distributes the network across eight. Each unaccounted building means a cabinet, a UPS feed and a fibre run. Clarify the count — or price to eight.
The package contains no alarm philosophy, no process SRS, no control narrative beyond the cause and effect charts. Confirm none were produced, so the bid carries their development as scope.
Partial stroke testing is specified for all 46 shutdown and blowdown valves; the SIL allocation supports it on eleven. Ask whether the Company will accept PST only where the SIL assessment requires it — 35 SIL rated auxiliaries on non-SIL valves is additional cost.
Discuss and Decide Internally
3 FINDINGSThe I/O list stops at roughly 1,800 hard-wired points and excludes the chemical injection skids, the metering package, the MCC and building ventilation. Comparable trains put the interface load near 500–600 additional points.
The controls equipment list is missing and cannot be rebuilt from the architecture drawing, which lacks its typical details. Price the ICSS from I/O counts and cabinet density typicals; rebuild the architecture with the selected supplier in the first month of detailed engineering.
The philosophy is deliberately traditional — no remote I/O, every loop in one SIL 3 solver. Remote I/O alone would cut an estimated 40% of homerun cabling and one marshalling room. Decide how to proceed.
Add Contingency
3 FINDINGSThe instrument and I/O lists do not include the vendor packages, the MCC or the building ventilation systems. The control system will be sized and priced on these incomplete counts, and the missing points — an estimated 500 to 600 — will enter the design later as change. Cover the additional I/O hardware and engineering, the marshalling cabinets and the cabling between the packages and the system room.
The controls equipment list is missing, and the architecture drawing lacks the detail to rebuild it. The system will be priced without a verified equipment count. Add contingency covering the re-development with the selected supplier and the cabinets and hardware it is likely to add.
The philosophy requires partial stroke testing on all 46 shutdown valves; the SIL allocation justifies it on eleven. If the bid is priced on the leaner reading and the Company later insists on the full requirement, the difference is not in the estimate. Add contingency covering the smart positioners for the remaining 35 valves and the SIL-rated I/O for the loops returned to the safety system.
Request Qualification
3 FINDINGSClarify PSV re-sizing strategy as per the re-rated compressor capacities; try to exclude re-sizing cost from the base lump sum if not clarified.
Request the bunding and drainage strategy particularly with clear reference to incompatible chemicals in the tank site.
Request the missing discharge data and flare routing philosophy to finalize radiation zone and relevant layout design considerations.
Discuss and Decide Internally
3 FINDINGSTake a position on the obsolescent equipment choices found in the FEED — carry them as specified, or offer alternatives through a formal deviation.
Pump duty flows conflict between the equipment list and the datasheets. Decide the equipment list governs at tender stage.
The maximum inlet pressure to the HP flare is 3 barg which would be the maximum operating pressure of the HP Flare Drum. There is no apparent reason explaining why the drum designed for 10 barg. EPC Contractor may reconsider the case for reducing the cost.
Add Contingency
3 FINDINGSAdd contingency for missing instrumented safeguards — the pumps have no dry-running protection and the receiving basins no overflow.
Contingency for the open FEED HAZOP actions — 19 of 27 remain unresolved on the P&IDs.
Contingency for thermal relief on isolatable, sun-exposed wash water and chemical piping within the OSBL.
Request Qualification
3 FINDINGSNew MV loads and capacitor banks are to land on existing switchgears. Obtain written confirmation of spare cubicle availability before pricing the connections.
The prefabricated e-house arrives with no information on its HVAC and firefighting systems. Confirm the assumption that both are vendor scope — or price them.
Since the main substation is located at the south end of the plant, there are some concerns regarding the north end electrical consumers where the cable length reaches 300 m or more. Clarify the reason for this preliminary settlement if any.
Discuss and Decide Internally
3 FINDINGSOwner mandates use of a pre-selected vendor list. Identify the potential risks and completeness of documentation from that particular vendors.
FEED company identified some required corrections as marked up in the attached electrical drawing package. They pointed out an opportunity for improvement as to connect the standby 6.6kV Generator to the MV SWGR. Consider this issue as a value engineering potential.
Agree the take-off basis and maturity factor applied to electrical bulks — trays, cables, junction boxes, lighting, grounding — whose quantities will move with civil, HVAC and instrumentation revisions.
Add Contingency
3 FINDINGSAdd contingency for bulk quantities, tray lengths, cable runs, junction boxes, lighting fixtures and grounding, due to potential growth after HVAC, civil and instrumentation changes.
Add contingency for load growth eroding the transformer, generator and UPS margins once the under-rated HVAC is re-calculated.
Contingency for Ex-rated equipment in the zones since the HAC has yet to be drawn.
Request Qualification
3 FINDINGSNo calculation report exists for the stormy, oily and domestic drainage systems. Request it — pond, pit and pipe sizing cannot be verified from the drawings alone.
The security requirements define a 2.5 km access road elevated against flood and a carpark; neither has a single drawing in the package. Confirm the scope and the design basis.
No pavement is shown around the buildings. Confirm that the gravel finish stated in the tender bulletin governs, and record it as the estimating basis.
Discuss and Decide Internally
3 FINDINGSThe wall insulation is mineral wool in the specification and combustible PU panels on the drawings. Price the non-combustible material — mineral wool — and address the safety issues around the equipment.
Some corrosion allowance should be considered in the material take off for piles (typically 3mm) and concrete. Salty environment and shallow groundwater is anticipated.
Agree on the fire-proofing philosophy and prepare the envelope study for the main process area since the need is left to be decided by the EPC contractor. This issue is a major cost-relevant item.
Add Contingency
3 FINDINGSThe equipment foundations are designed on preliminary vendor loads; no certified vendor drawings exist in the package, and the dynamic loads of the rotating equipment are stated as assumed. Add contingency for foundation resizing, anchor bolt revisions and structural reinforcement once certified vendor data replaces the assumptions.
No building risk assessment exists in the package, and the occupied buildings are specified as conventional structures. If the assessment required by API RP 752 assigns blast or fire loads to the control room, substation or operator shelters, the structural design changes category. Add contingency for blast-resistant construction of the affected buildings.
Add contingency for fire-proofing materials, site works, steel tonnage, civil foundation and structural elements even after the fire proofing envelope study. Consider layout alternatives in the FEED and potential process condition alterations in the cracker as anticipated within the FEED study.
Request Qualification
3 FINDINGSThe piping classes list soft-seated ball valves in hydrocarbon service with no fire-safe end or gasket requirement. Confirm whether fire-safe design governs — the answer changes the specification of roughly 180 valves.
The layout philosophy defines segregation clearly, yet the produced water booster pumps — among the main ignition sources on the plot — sit directly beside the tank area, placed there for mechanical reasons. Ask the Company whether this siting is fixed, or whether relocation and ignition control provisions are expected during FEED.
The philosophy requires that no connection exists between tanks inside the bunds, while the drainage arrangement shows shared paths. Clarify the intended routing.
Discuss and Decide Internally
3 FINDINGSThe east pipe rack still carries a 120 m segment that served a unit deleted earlier in the design. Removing it saves steel and cable tray, and the bid team will want that saving. Decide the condition first: the segment comes out only after someone checks what else it does — fire water and escape routes may run along it, and its removal changes spacing on both sides.
The transient analysis shows the injection manifold reaching within 0.4 bar of its design pressure on pump trip. The result is based on assumed valve closing characteristics, as vendor data was not available at the time of the study. Decide to repeat the analysis with confirmed stroke times and valve dynamics once vendor data is received, and to hold the procurement of surge-critical valves until the revised analysis verifies the margin. A shorter effective closure time than assumed would produce a higher surge pressure and could exceed the design limit.
The plot plan locates the future phase tie-in points inside the operating unit. Each future connection will therefore require shutdown, isolation and hot work next to live equipment. Decide whether the bid moves these tie-ins to the unit battery limit, terminated with spectacle blinds and isolation valves. The piping cost now is limited; left as drawn, the cost returns later as shutdown duration and hot work in a classified area.
Add Contingency
3 FINDINGSThe drainage vessel sits in the middle of the process area, about 9 m from the main rack; NFPA 30 asks for 15 m. The north sleepers also run tight against the tank bund, close enough for a pipe leak to drain into the bund volume. The safety reviews are likely to move both. Add contingency covering the relocation of the vessel, the rerouted piping it drags with it and the modification of the affected rack and sleeper sections.
The two-phase flare laterals carry slug forces, and the support drawings that should verify them are missing from the package. If the check shows the FEED supports inadequate for these dynamic loads, the correction runs along every lateral, not one point. Add contingency covering the slug-load supports and hold-downs, the reinforcement of the rack steel carrying them, and rerouting with expansion loops where supporting alone does not resolve the load.
The tank foundations rest on a site investigated with two borings, and the piping is connected rigidly to the tank shells. If detailed geotechnical work confirms differential settlement, the tank nozzles become the weakest point on the line — nozzle loads exceed allowables as the tank moves and the pipe does not. Add contingency covering the flexibility rework at every tank connection: expansion loops, spring supports, and relocation of the first pipe supports off the tank foundation.
The Hidden Bid Exposure of Safety Assumptions
Additional safety-critical equipment
Higher equipment certification requirements
Increased fireproofing or passive fire protection scope
Revised hazardous area classification and electrical specifications
Additional F&G detectors, voting logic or cause & effect revisions
Larger UPS, emergency power or safeguarding system requirements
Revised relief, blowdown or flare design basis
Layout changes affecting piping, cable routing, access and constructability
Late SIF identification or higher SIL requirements
Additional studies such as dispersion, explosion, fire scenario or functional safety assessments
Contractual claims, exclusions or technical qualifications after bid submission
Once the lump-sum is signed, every undocumented assumption in the FEED package is yours.
When This Service is Most Valuable?
This service is especially valuable when:
- The project is entering EPC lump-sum bidding
- FEED has been prepared by another contractor or licensor
- Safety studies exist but their assumptions are unclear
- Multiple disciplines or third parties contributed to the FEED package
- The Owner requires bid confidence before award
- The EPC bidder needs to protect itself from unclear safety obligation
